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Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
 
Real exchange rate, output and oil: Case of four large  
energy producers
1 




We assess the effects of oil price shocks on real exchange rate and output in four large 
energy-producing countries: Iran, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, and Russia. We estimate four-
variable structural vector autoregressive models using standard long-run restrictions. Not 
surprisingly, we find that higher real oil prices are associated with higher output. However, 
we also find that supply shocks are by far the most important driver of real output in all 
four countries, possibly due to ongoing transition and catching-up. Similarly, oil shocks do 
not account for a large share of movements in the real exchange rate, although they are 
clearly more significant for Iran and Venezuela than for the other countries. 
  
JEL codes: E31, E32, F31, Q43 
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Tässä työssä tutkitaan öljyn hintasokkien vaikutusta reaaliseen valuuttakurssiin ja koko-
naistuotantoon neljässä energiantuottajamaassa: Iranissa, Kazakstanissa, Venezuelassa ja 
Venäjällä. Tutkimuksessa estimoidaan neljän muuttujan rakenteellinen vektoriautoregres-
siivinen malli yleisesti käytettyjen pitkän aikavälin rajoitteiden avulla. Öljyn kalliimpi re-
aalihinta kasvattaa maiden tuotantoa, mikä ei ole yllättävää. On kuitenkin huomattava, että 
tarjontapuolen sokit selittävät suurimman osan tuotannon muutoksista, mikä voi johtua 
maiden talouksien rakennemuutoksista. Öljysokit eivät myöskään selitä kovinkaan suurta 
osaa reaalisen valuuttakurssin muutoksista, vaikka ne ovatkin selvästi tärkeämpiä Iranille 
ja Venezuelalle kuin muille maille. 
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1  Introduction  
 
In this paper we assess the effects of oil price shocks on real exchange rates and output in 
four major energy-producing countries: Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Venezuela. Iran and 
Venezuela belong to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), while 
Russia and Kazakhstan do not. However, they all are highly dependent on energy in their 
exports. For Russia, oil and oil products, together with natural gas, accounted for 60% of 
exports in 2007; for Kazakhstan the corresponding share was slightly over 50%. In the two 
OPEC countries, the share of energy in total exports is even higher, more than 80% in Iran 
and more than 90% in Venezuela. The price of energy is the most important determinant of 
the terms of trade for these countries.
2 Therefore, it is of interest to examine how the vola-
tility of oil price affects their real exchange rates. 
The analysis presented here has applicability for other countries as well. Many 
emerging market countries are major producers of raw materials and thus may be highly 
dependent on the price of a single commodity. Moreover, many emerging market countries 
exhibit 'fear of floating' (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), i.e. they tightly manage their nominal 
exchange rates, even though their currencies are not officially pegged. This seems to be 
case with our countries as well, although they differ in specifics of exchange rate regimes. 
For example, Venezuela maintains a peg to the US dollar and relies heavily on capital con-
trols. Both Russia and Kazakhstan have managed their exchange rates around central pari-
ties, while maintaining a degree of discretion as to the central parity.  
Estimating structural vector autoregressive models (SVAR) with long-run restric-
tions, our results show that oil price shocks account for only a small share of overall 
shocks affecting the real exchange rates in these countries. Only in Iran and Venezuela 
does a positive oil price shock lead to appreciation of the real exchange rate, as the theory 
would suggest. In contrast, demand shocks explain 50% to 90% of variation in the real ex-
change rate. Our results are in line with those of Clarida and Galí (1994) who evaluate the 
importance of various structural shocks for exchange rate movements in four G7 econo-
mies. In fact, our estimated system is a direct extension of their open macro model, aug-
mented with oil price shocks in the spirit of Huang and Guo (2007). Our results could thus 
be seen to suggest that recent movements in emerging economies’ exchange rates have 
 
2 Even though there are no international spot markets for natural gas, like there are for crude oil, the price of 
natural gas tends to follow the price of crude oil, albeit with a lag. Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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been largely driven by the same shocks as in the advanced economies since the collapse of 
Bretton Woods.  
While our main emphasis is on real exchange rates, we also estimate the effects of 
oil shocks on output. Oil price shocks are found to have a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect on domestic output, with the exception of Iran. However, oil shocks play a rela-
tively minor role in the movements in real GDP. Supply shocks explain 45% to 90% of the 
movements in output. This suggests that the importance of oil for these economies should 
not be overemphasised, at least as an independent source of shocks driving GDP. A recent 
paper by Husain et al. (2008) estimates a panel VAR model for ten oil-producing countries 
and finds that oil prices have no statistically significant effect on the countries' non-oil out-
put, and the effect on GDP is realised only via pro-cyclical fiscal policy.   
We make several contributions in this paper. We extend the analysis of oil-
producing economies by including explicit oil-price shocks in structural vector autoregres-
sive models. To our knowledge, this has not been previously done in the literature. By es-
timating similar models for four countries, we are also able to compare the effects of oil 
shocks on their exchange rates. We are able to discern somewhat different responses e.g. to 
oil and monetary shocks in these countries, possibly because of differences in exchange 
rate policies. We are also able to determine that in our data sample the relationship be-
tween oil prices and domestic GDP is linear, with the possible exception of Venezuela. For 
that economy, linearity tests suggest that an alternative modelling strategy explicitly ac-
counting for nonlinearities could be a possible alternative.  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the eco-
nomic policies of the four economies during the period under review. The third section of-
fers a selective literature survey, and the fourth section presents the underlying theoretical 
model in more detail. The fifth section discusses the empirical methodology and data used, 
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2  Economic policies in our sample of oil-producers 
 
In the four countries in our sample, the current decade has been characterised by very rapid 
economic growth. Growth has been given impetus by high prices of raw materials, which 
have boosted the countries’ export revenues. Also, in Russia and Kazakhstan net exports 
have been helped by the steep depreciation of the countries’ currencies in the wake of their 
financial crises in 1998-9. In Iran the currency was officially devalued in 2002, although 
the unofficial exchange rate had registered a sizeable depreciation already in 1999. Since 
2002, the official exchange rate has depreciated steadily. For most of the period under 
study here, the authorities’ main challenge has been to prevent overheating of the econo-
mies. In this, policy-makers have used both fiscal and monetary policies. Their task has 
been complicated by the external economic environment: as liquidity in the international 
capital markets increased abundantly so did capital inflows, especially into Kazakhstan and 
Russia. 
As a result of rapid economic growth, all countries in our sample have seen their 
tax revenues increase. For the most part, the sizeable fiscal surpluses have been used to pay 
down public debt and set up sovereign wealth funds, which have invested fiscal surpluses 
in the international capital markets. However, the tightness of fiscal policy has varied 
across countries and over time. For example, in Iran fiscal policy was tightened considera-
bly in 2007 after fiscal easing in 2005 and 2006. In Venezuela fiscal policy has been looser 
throughout the period under study.   
As regards monetary and exchange rate policies the countries under review have 
behaved somewhat differently, although there are many similarities as well. Before their 
financial crises (August 1998 in Russia and April 1999 in Kazakhstan), both Russia and 
Kazakhstan used the nominal exchange rate as the nominal anchor - a common practice in 
the transition economies. However, especially in Russia fiscal policy was not compatible 
with the fixed exchange rate, and eventually the country was forced to allow the rouble to 
float and postpone its debt payments. Kazakhstan was forced to follow suit, because after 
the Russian devaluation its exports lost their competitiveness.  
After abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime, Russia opted for a policy where 
the central bank and government agree on inflation targets, but there is also a publicly an-
nounced ceiling for appreciation of the real exchange rate (for a more detailed description 
of Russia’s monetary policy regime, see Korhonen and Mehrotra, 2009). In addition, since Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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interbank markets do not yet function very efficiently, the Central Bank of Russia’s main 
policy tool continues to be foreign currency intervention. These factors have led to a situa-
tion where the rouble’s exchange rate has sometimes been rather tightly managed. In Ka-
zakhstan, policy objectives have been somewhat more opaque, but the exchange rate 
against the US dollar was very stable between 2000 and 2004, after which it has been al-
lowed to appreciate slightly. Therefore, both Russia and Kazakhstan can be said to manage 
their exchange rates fairly tightly, even though they are not officially pursuing a policy of 
fixed exchange rates. 
Both Iran and Venezuela have maintained much tighter capital controls through-
out the sample period than e.g. Russia and Kazakhstan. This allowed the official and mar-
ket exchange rates in Iran to diverge considerably before 2002. Since then, the Iranian rial 
has followed a crawling peg, first against the US dollar, and from late 2007 against a bas-
ket of dollar, euro, and yen. During our sample period Venezuela went through several dif-
ferent exchange rate regimes. Before July 1996 it, like Iran, applied multiple exchange 
rates and extensive capital controls. From 1996 to 2002, Venezuela maintained an ex-
change rate band, whereas the currency was subject to a managed float in 2002 and 2003. 
Since 2003 there has been a peg to the US dollar. 
All countries in our sample have maintained oil or stabilisation funds in the recent 
years. However, these have been relatively small until just recently (see e.g. Beck and Fi-
dora, 2008). And the sizes differ considerably from one country to another. Therefore, the 
effect of stabilisation funds on the link between oil price and exchange rate has probably 
been relatively small during our sample period.  
 
 
3  Brief literature survey 
 
Our analysis is related to several strands of literature. In recent years a number of papers 
have estimated the effects of oil price shocks on different economies. However, most of 
these focus on countries that are net importers of energy products (see e.g. Kilian, 2008). 
Here, we are interested in energy exporting countries. In addition, there are a number of 
papers that focus on macroeconomic effects of oil price changes in Russia, as a rapidly de-
veloping transition economy. Our contribution has obvious links to these papers as well. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




At least until recently, macroeconomists have viewed changes in the price of oil as an im-
portant source of economic fluctuations. However, there are several recent studies that in-
dicate that the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks have become less pronounced. 
Related to the more general effect of oil prices (as a proxy for energy prices in more gen-
eral), one might mention Cologni and Manera (2008), who use a structural VAR to exam-
ine the effects of oil price shocks in G7 countries. They find that oil-price increases have a 
dampening effect on economic growth, but that the effect seems to mainly work via tighter 
monetary policy, as central banks try to prevent higher oil prices from feeding into general 
inflation. In a recent paper, Blanchard and Galí (2007) stress that the events of the past 
decade indicate that oil prices are not a significant source of economic fluctuations. They 
find at least four reasons for the milder effects on inflation and economic activity of the 
recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) 
smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labour markets, and (d) improvements 
in monetary policy. Therefore, one might conclude that at least for developed countries the 
price of oil (and perhaps energy more generally) is not as important as it was a few decades 
ago. 
Moving to somewhat less developed countries, Huang and Guo (2007) look at the 
effects of an oil price shock for an emerging market economy, more specifically China. 
They are interested in how the oil price impacts China's real exchange rate, and use a struc-
tural VAR methodology to study the relationship. They find that China's real effective ex-
change rate would actually appreciate as a result of a positive oil price shock. This result is 
apparently due to the fact that China's economy is less energy-intensive than those of its 
main trading partners. With an increase in the price of oil, China's GDP increases relative 
to its trading partners. 
Closer to our analysis, there are a number of papers looking at the effects of oil 
price on oil-producing countries as well. Rautava (2004) develops a small VAR model to 
examine these dynamics in the Russian economy and shows that oil has played a signifi-
cant role in movements of Russian GDP. Higher oil price leads to higher GDP, in both the 
short and long run. On the other hand, in the model, a higher oil price does not lead to a 
stronger real exchange rate, although the author conjectures that this may be because of the 
estimation strategy. Oomes and Kalcheva (2007) look at the factors affecting Russia's real 
exchange appreciation in a cointegration framework. They find that the oil price has a di-
rect effect on the real effective exchange rate, and the elasticity of the real effective ex-Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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change rate with respect to the oil price is roughly 0.5, irrespective of the exact specifica-
tion. Korhonen and Juurikkala (2009) investigate the effect of oil on real exchange rates in 
a sample of OPEC countries. In their panel cointegration framework, the estimated elastic-
ity is again approximately 0.5. For another major oil producer, Norway, Bjornland (2004), 
using a structural vector autoregressive framework, shows that an oil price shock stimu-
lates the economy temporarily but has no significant long-run impact. Price level effects 
are also found to be positive, but these are realised very slowly. The author finds no evi-
dence to support the proposition that a major part of real exchange rate appreciation in 
Norway was driven by oil price shocks.  
It should be noted that our contribution differs from the papers utilising cointegra-
tion methods. We for instance do not calculate the elasticity of real exchange rate with re-
spect to oil price. The empirical framework requires that all variables be stationary in the 
estimated system and so the reduced form system consists of first-differenced variables. 
Importantly, the focus of the analysis is on the relative importance of oil price shocks with 
respect to the other structural shocks that we are able to identify within the chosen frame-
work. In this sense, our paper is linked to studies that analyse shocks driving real exchange 
rate movements in an SVAR framework with long-run restrictions, such as Clarida and 
Galí (1994) for advanced economies, Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001) for Brazil and Korea, 
and Wang (2005) for China. 
Our paper is also linked to those studies that analyse the possible asymmetric rela-
tionships between oil prices and macroeconomic variables, as we test the linear benchmark 
model against a smooth transition regression (STR) model. The latter allows the dynamics 
between variables to vary across regimes. Extending the results by Hamilton (1983), Mork 
(1989) showed that oil price increases do reduce economic growth in the US but that a fall 
in oil prices has a statistically insignificant impact on growth. Lee et al. (1995) find that the 
impact of an oil price change on aggregate output is greater in an environment where oil 
prices have been stable than in an environment of erratic energy prices. In the context of a 
multivariate threshold model for the US, Canada and Japan, Huang et al. (2005) argue that 
an oil price change has a larger impact on macroeconomic activity, once the change ex-
ceeds a certain threshold level. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on the so-called resource curse. It is well-
known in the literature that large rents from commodity exports can lead to sub-optimal 
economic outcomes in the medium and long run. In the short run the effect may still be BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 






t t m m ε + = −1
t t s o s y
positive, often because fiscal policy is pro-cyclical. For example, Collier and Goderis 
(2007) provide evidence from oil price booms in African countries and find that in a vector 
error-correction framework higher oil prices are associated with higher GDP growth, but in 
the long run the correlation between GDP level and oil price is negative.  
Based on this brief literature survey, one might expect that a positive oil price 
shock has a direct and positive effect on GDP in major oil producers, at least in the short 
run. However, the effect on the real exchange rate is not straightforward. Oil-producing 




4  Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical model behind our empirics is a dynamic open economy Mundell-Fleming-
Dornbusch model, augmented with an oil price variable, as in Huang and Guo (2007). The 
oil price enters the theoretical framework through the aggregate supply relation, and in the 
long run only oil price shocks are allowed to impact oil prices themselves. As detailed dis-
cussions of the model are already available in the literature, we only present the main fea-
tures below. In the following, all variables except the world oil price are expressed as ra-
tios of domestic variables to corresponding US variables, as in Clarida and Galí (1994).  
The real oil price ot, aggregate demand dt and supply st as well as money mt, are 
each assumed to follow an autonomous stochastic process:  
o
t t o o ε + = −1      ( 1 )  
s
t t s s ε + = −1        ( 2 )  
t
d
t t d d ε + = −1       ( 3 )  
      ( 4 )  
 
The supply of output is determined by its own random walk process and the oil price as  
,        ( 5 )   + = γ
where γ denotes the inverse energy elasticity of output.  
 Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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t t t t i y p m    
Demand for output is determined by its random walk process and the real exchange rate et 
as 
      ( 6 )
  
This can be considered an open economy IS equation, where domestic output (relative to 
foreign output) is increasing in the real exchange rate. As in Clarida and Galí (1994), we 
assume that dt captures shocks to domestic relative to foreign absorption.  In the goods 
market equilibrium, the following holds:  . We further assume a standard LM 
relation:  
λ δ − + =
) ( t t t e E i =
o
s o













t t p ε φ λ ε φ λγ δγ ε φ λ δ ε ) / ( )) / ( ( )) / ( ( − + − + + − + = Δ
,       ( 7 )  
 
where the transactions demand for (real) money is increasing in output and de-
creasing in the rate of interest. Finally, there is an interest parity condition: 
.        ( 8 )  
Solving equations (1)-(8) yields:  
t t o ε = Δ        ( 9 )  
and 
t t t y ε γε + = Δ       ( 1 0 )  
and 
    
 
Finally, using (7)-(11), we obtain the following expression for the change in price level:  
   (12) 
 
From (9)-(12), we see that the relationships between structural shocks can be ex-
pressed in a triangular order. Namely, while oil price is determined solely by oil price 
shocks in the long run, the price level is determined by all four structural shocks in the long 
run. National (relative to foreign) output is affected by both supply shocks and oil price 
shocks in the long run, while the real exchange rate is determined by oil, demand and sup-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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ply shocks. This allows us to fit the theoretical model to the data by utilizing structural 
vector autoregressions with Blanchard-Quah (1989) type long-run restrictions. These are 




5  Methodology and data 
 
The advantage of the SVAR approach is that the system dynamics can be easily investi-
gated via impulse response analysis, and the statistical significance of the various shocks 
can be evaluated with confidence intervals. Moreover, the relative importance of stochastic 
shocks can be examined by forecast error variance decomposition. The different structural 
shocks are identified by means of long-run restrictions, whereby certain shocks are allowed 
to have long-run impacts on all or some of the system variables. 
The following discussion on the SVAR approach relies to a large extent on Brei-
tung et al. (2004). The starting point is a reduced form K-dimensional VAR model that can 
be written as:  
 
.     (13)   
 
In (13), xt is a (K × 1) vector of endogenous variables. Our four system variables 
are real GDP (yt), consumer price index (pt), real exchange rate (et), and oil price (ot). The 
Ai are fixed (K × K) coefficient matrices, and we assume that ut follows a K-dimensional 
white noise process with E(ut) = 0. Deterministic terms are omitted here for simplicity. 
While our focus is on the impacts of various structural shocks on real GDP and real ex-
change rate, these structural shocks are not directly observable. Hence, certain restrictions 
must be imposed in order to identify them from the data. A structural form representation 
of (14) is written as  
 
.       (15) 
Here, the vector εt represents the structural shocks, i.e. supply shocks εt
s, demand 
shocks εt
d, monetary shocks εt
m, and oil price shocks εt
o. The structural shocks are assumed 
to be uncorrelated and orthogonal. The Ai
*’s (i = 1, ..., p) are (K×K) coefficient matrices, Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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and B is a structural form parameter matrix. We note that the reduced form errors can be 
linked to the structural form disturbances through           ut = A
-1B εt. In general, the shocks 
to the system can be analysed in the framework of a Wold moving average representation: 
 








1 ) ... (
s
p K s
.,       (16) 
where Φs=IK. 
The  are computed recursively, given the Aj coefficients of the reduced 
form VAR, Eq. (13). Interpretation of the (a, b)th element of the matrices Φs is straight-
forward. It displays the response of xa, t+s to a unit change in xbt. Thus the elements of Φs 




Our focus on impacts of structural shocks is centred on their long-run effects on 




− − − − = Φ = Φ
1 A A I .     (17) 
 
The structure of the theoretical model allows us to examine the long-run impacts of the 
shocks by specifying a long-run impact matrix, Ψ, that is lower triangular. In such a ma-
trix, all elements above the main diagonal are set to zero. Given the order of the variables 
in the reduced form VAR vector xt = [ot, yt, et, pt]', the lower triangular form implies that 
no other shock is allowed to have a long-run impact on the world oil price. A permanent 
impact on output is allowed in the long-run for oil-price and supply shocks. The exchange 
rate can be affected in the long run by all the other structural shocks except a monetary 
shock, and we allow all the structural shocks to have a long-run impact on prices. All these 
restrictions are in line with the theoretical model specified in the previous section. 
 
The impulse responses can be calculated by estimating the contemporaneous impact C= A
-
1B. The long-run impact of structural shocks Ψ is obtained from Ψ=ΦC, such that Ψ Ψ´= Φ 
Σu Φ´ = 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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u
(IK – A1 - … - Ap)
-1 Σu (IK – A'1 - … - A'p)
-1.       (18)
  
The lower triangular matrix Ψ can then be obtained from a Choleski decomposition of 
(18), and C is estimated by  
⎤ ⎡ Φ Σ Φ Φ = Ψ Φ =





This procedure can be utilized only on condition that the VAR model is station-
ary. Evidence of this is provided in the section discussing the estimation of our system. 
The estimation samples are based on data availability as follows: Russia 1995Q2-2007Q1; 
Kazakhstan 1995Q2-2006Q4; Iran 1991Q2-2006Q4; Venezuela 1997Q2-2008Q1. While 
the relatively short samples weaken the statistical significance of the results, we feel they 
are long enough for inferences as to structural long-run shocks in these economies. Real oil 
prices are derived by deflating nominal oil prices by the US consumer price index. The 
data for oil, exchange rates and US variables are obtained from the IFS database. Other 
data series originate in the databases of the Russian and Kazakhstan central banks, and the 
Iranian and Venezuelan statistical offices. The time series for relative output and real ex-
change rate series – in relation to the US - as well as for oil price are depicted in Figures 
A.1 and A.2 in the appendix. 
 
 
6  Estimation results 
 
In order to evaluate the responses of output and real exchange rate to the various structural 
shocks in the four economies, we need a data-congruent reduced form VAR representation. 
The procedure presented in the previous section is estimable only when the underlying se-
ries are stationary. Consistently with previous studies utilizing an identical methodology, 
we include all series in first differences in the estimated system. This is also consistent 
with our theoretical model; we are not interested in potential cointegration between the 
time series. The stationarity of the first-differenced series is confirmed by the standard 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Specifically, when a constant is included as a deter-
ministic term, the null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected for all series for Kazakhstan, Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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Iran and world oil price at least at the 5% level.
3 For Venezuela, a unit root can be rejected 
at least at the 5% level for all other series except the real exchange rate (10% level). For 
Russia, we reject the null hypothesis of unit root for both prices and the real exchange rate, 
although for the latter variable only at the 10% level. Due to the drop in output induced by 
the Russian crisis, a standard ADF test for GDP does not reject the null of unit root for this 
series. It is likely that the break point caused by the crisis renders the standard unit root test 
unreliable. Indeed, when a unit root test with a structural break is used instead, as sug-
gested by Lanne et al. (2002), the null hypothesis of unit root for GDP is rejected even at 
the 1% level.
4 We therefore continue on the assumption that all the series in first-
differenced form are stationary.  
Next, we estimate the reduced form VAR for our four oil producing countries, re-
calling that the vector of endogenous variables is written as xt = [ot, yt, et, pt]'. Ordering of 
the variables is dictated by our theoretical model; any other ordering would render the in-
terpretation of results very difficult. The models are estimated with 3 lags, which is reason-
able for first-differenced series of quarterly data. A constant is included as a deterministic 
term for all economies, corresponding to a trend in levels-form data. Due to the inclusion 
of the Russian crisis in the estimation sample, we need to include three dummy variables in 
the estimated system – two for removing the immediate impacts of the crisis and the re-
maining one to deal with a further residual outlier. For Iran, Kazakhstan and Venezuela, 
various dummies are similarly included in the estimated systems in order to remove resid-
ual outliers.
5   
Testing for residual autocorrelation in higher lag orders by the standard Portman-
teau test and for ARCH effects (16 lags utilized in both tests) suggests that the models are 
satisfactory representations of the data, as the p-values for both tests never fall below 0.05. 
However, evidence of autocorrelation in lower lag orders is detected for Venezuela when 
the LM-F test with 1 lag is utilized. Stability tests are also of interest, given that these 
economies are undergoing structural change, which could theoretically make the dynamics 
between the endogenous variables unstable. Due to the short sample, we are able to utilize 
 
3 This result is robust to using either the Akaike, Hannan-Quinn, or Schwarz criteria to determine lag length. 
4 In the test by Lanne et al. (2002), we include an impulse dummy variable that takes the value one in 
1998Q3 and zero otherwise.   
5 In the case of Russia, the impulse dummies take the value one for 1998Q1, 1998Q3 and 1998Q4. For Ka-
zakhstan, the dummy variables take the value one for 1998Q3 and 1999Q2. For Iran, we use a shift dummy 
that takes the value one for 2002Q1-2002Q2. In the case of Venezuela, impulse dummies take the value one 
in 2002Q3 and 2003Q2. For all other periods, the dummies take the value zero. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




the Chow forecast test to search for a structural break for each observation during 2000Q4-
2006Q3 for Kazakhstan, 2000Q4-2005Q1 for Iran, 2001Q1-2006Q4 for Russia, and 
2002Q3-2007Q4 for Venezuela. We utilize bootstrapped p-values, as suggested by Can-
delon and Lütkepohl (2001), with 1,000 replications. Parameter stability cannot be rejected 
for any tested date at the 5% level for Russia, Iran or Kazakhstan. However, for Venezuela, 
p-values below 0.05 are detected for various different break dates, which advises caution in 
interpreting the results for this economy.   
We investigate the effects of the various structural shocks via structural form im-
pulse response analysis. We commence by looking at the impact of a positive oil price 
shock on domestic output in the four economies, depicted in Figure 1. The Hall 90% per-
centile bootstrapped confidence intervals are used in the analysis, computed with 1,000 
replications. The level of GDP increases as a result of an oil price shock for all the coun-
tries except Iran. This is expected, as a positive shock to oil price represents a positive sup-
ply shock for a major oil-producing economy. It induces an increase in incomes and wealth 
and supports consumption, given a constant propensity to consumption from income and 
wealth. It should be noted that if we used data from several decades, the long-run GDP re-
sponse could of course be negative, which would be consistent with the resource curse hy-
pothesis.  
The impacts of all the structural shocks on GDP are illustrated in Figure A.3 in the 
appendix. Consistently with theory and the restrictions imposed in the structural model, a 
supply shock leads to a permanent impact on the level of GDP in all economies. An anom-
aly is the impact of a demand shock on GDP in Kazakhstan, as real GDP falls. In Clarida 
and Galí (1994), positive money shocks lead to higher relative output, as is clearly the case 
in both Kazakhstan and Russia.  Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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Figure 1. Effects of a positive oil price shock on GDP 
 
 
   
Iran Kazakhstan 
   
Russia Venezuela 
 
Regarding the effects of a positive oil price shock on the real exchange rate in Figure 2, for 
Iran and Venezuela we obtain an appreciation in the real exchange rate. This impact could 
work via domestic pricing, whereby an increase in incomes and wealth in an oil-producing 
country puts upward pressure on domestic prices, especially through the increased demand 
for non-tradeables. This effect could work through pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
6 Moreover, if 
a country improves its net foreign asset position through the accumulation of fiscal sur-
pluses, its debt servicing costs fall. Lower debt servicing costs reduce the need to export, 
which enables appreciation of the real exchange rate. However, the impacts on the real ex-
change rate are not statistically significant for Kazakhstan or Russia. As these two econo-
mies have maintained discretion with regard to the level of the nominal exchange rate, one 
would expect oil-price induced price increases to result in real exchange rate appreciation. 
However, the real exchange rate may be a poor indicator of domestic price pressures, as 
                                                 
6 Since we do not have quarterly fiscal data for all the countries, we cannot directly control for the countries' 
fiscal stance in the estimations. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
e.g. in Russia food prices carry a weight of 40% in the CPI.
7 Similarly, after the financial 
crises of 1998/1999, fiscal tightening across the board may have eased appreciation pres-
sures in Kazakhstan and Russia – in contrast to the more lax policies pursued in Iran and 
Venezuela.  
The impacts of all structural shocks on the real exchange rate are depicted in Fig-
ure A.4 in the appendix. In all economies, in our model specification, a demand shock 
leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As a supply shock should lead to a fall in 
the price of home country output, the real exchange rate should depreciate, which is indeed 
what we observe for Iran and Russia. For Kazakhstan and Venezuela, the impact is positive 
and at odds with the theoretical model.
8  
 
7 This result contrasts with the rouble depreciation pressure that emerged in autumn 2008. However, the re-
cent depreciation is likely due to several different factors, e.g. significant investor risk aversion, leading to 
capital flight from most emerging markets.  
8 The appreciation resulting from a supply shock is in line with the finding by Clarida and Galí (1994) for 
Germany (variables also expressed in relation to US) and the UK.  Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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Figure 2  Effects of a positive oil price shock on the real exchange rate 
 
 
   
Iran Kazakhstan 
   
Russia Venezuela 
 
Next, we look at the importance of different structural shocks in explaining movements in 
output and real exchange rate, using forecast error variance decomposition. Our interest is 
in examining the share of various shocks in movements of these variables when a specified 
number of quarters have passed since the shock. Table 1 shows that for all four economies 
an overwhelming share of output movements is explained by supply shocks. This is per-
haps not surprising given the transitional nature of Russia and Kazakhstan and the possibil-
ity that labour productivity and technological innovations are important drivers of output in 
the catching-up process of all four countries. This result accords with Wang (2005) for 
China, Ahmed (2003) for Latin American economies, and Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001) 
for Korea, even though none of these authors include oil prices in their model. Oil price 
shocks are important structural innovations for output growth, especially in Venezuela but 
also in Russia, which is consistent with the statistically significant impact obtained in the 
impulse response analysis. In contrast, they do not appear to be very important for Iran or 
Kazakhstan. The quantitative importance of oil price shocks for output in the long run for BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 








Table 1 Importance of structural shocks for domestic output 
 Iran 
Horizon Oil  Supply  Demand  Monetary 
1  0.04 0.80 0.15 0.02 
5  0.05 0.74 0.19 0.03 
10  0.05 0.73 0.19 0.03 
20  0.05 0.73 0.19 0.03 
 Kazakhstan 
 Oil  Supply  Demand  Monetary 
1  0.02 0.58 0.21 0.20 
5  0.08 0.59 0.17 0.15 
10  0.09 0.59 0.17 0.15 
20  0.09 0.60 0.17 0.15 
 Russia 
 Oil  Supply  Demand  Monetary 
1  0.01 0.90 0.00 0.08 
5  0.14 0.78 0.01 0.08 
10  0.15 0.77 0.01 0.08 
20  0.15 0.77 0.01 0.07 
 Venezuela 
 Oil  Supply  Demand  Monetary 
1  0.08 0.89 0.03 0.00 
5  0.20 0.50 0.13 0.16 
10  0.21 0.46 0.17 0.16 
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Table 2 Importance of structural shocks for real exchange rate against US dollar 
 Iran 
Horizon Oil  Supply  Demand  Monetary 
1  0.12 0.14 0.73 0.01 
5  0.19 0.12 0.69 0.01 
10  0.19 0.12 0.68 0.01 
20  0.19 0.12 0.68 0.01 
 Kazakhstan 
 Oil  Supply  Demand  Monetary 
1  0.04 0.10 0.78 0.07 
5  0.04 0.14 0.68 0.13 
10  0.04 0.17 0.65 0.14 
20  0.05 0.17 0.65 0.14 
 Russia 
 Oil  Supply  Demand  Monetary 
1  0.00 0.06 0.93 0.02 
5  0.03 0.08 0.88 0.02 
10  0.03 0.08 0.87 0.02 
20  0.03 0.08 0.87 0.02 
 Venezuela 
 Oil  Supply  Demand  Monetary 
1  0.00 0.07 0.67 0.26 
5  0.09 0.10 0.51 0.29 
10  0.11 0.11 0.50 0.29 
20  0.11 0.11 0.50 0.29 
 
 
Turning to the importance of structural shocks for the real exchange rate, demand shocks 
turn out to rank high for all the economies. In Russia, they account for roughly 90% of 
movements in the real exchange rate. Only for Iran and Venezuela do oil price shocks ac-
count for a notable share of movements of the real exchange rate, in line with their statisti-
cal significance in the impulse response setup.  In Kazakhstan and Russia, oil shocks are of 
little importance for movements in the exchange rate. In Iran and Russia - where supply 
shocks lead to exchange rate depreciation, albeit with modest statistical significance – the 
share of supply shocks for exchange rate movements is roughly 10%. Together, the impor-
tance of supply shocks for exchange rate fluctuations is found to be smaller and that of 
demand shocks larger than for two other emerging economies, Korea and Brazil, studied in 
Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001).  
It is of interest to examine the robustness of earlier results on real exchange rate 
determination by estimating the SVAR system without the oil price variable, but maintain-
ing the same variable ordering. In this case, we can directly compare our results to Clarida BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




and Galí (1994) and Wang (2005), as our model is a direct extension of their trivariate sys-
tem. The results are shown in Table A.1. in the appendix. Importance of demand shocks 
remains robust, although for Iran the importance of both supply and monetary shocks in-
creases – the former possibly because an oil price shock also represents a positive supply 
shock for a major oil-producing economy. For Venezuela, the importance of monetary 
shocks increases when oil prices are not included. The main general difference between 
our results and those for the advanced economies (Germany, Japan, Britain, Canada) stud-
ied in Clarida and Galí (1994) is that we find supply shocks to be more important for ex-
change rate determination. This is echoed in the results by Wang (2005) for China, where 
structural reforms have played a major role in boosting productivity.  
Recent literature has emphasized the possible nonlinearity between oil price shocks and 
real GDP. In particular, the effects may differ depending on the level of oil prices. We investigate 
possible non-linearity in the system by testing our linear model against a smooth transition regres-
sion (STR) model. The STR models include processes where the dynamics between the variables 
vary across regimes and the transition from one regime to the other is modeled as smooth by a lo-
gistic transition function. An LSTR1 model describes processes where the dynamics differ between 
regimes 1 and 2. In the context of an oil producing country, a large change in the world oil price 
may be more conducive to investment and growth (possibly in raw material extracting industries) 
than a minor change that may be expected to be quickly reversed. In an LSTR2 model, the dynam-
ics are similar for small and large values of the transition variable, and different in the middle. Such 
a scenario is less intuitive, but in an environment of very erratic oil prices, companies may find it 
difficult to compute profit-maximizing levels of output and therefore postpone their investments 
while a small change in oil prices is again expected to be reversed, similarly dampening further 
investment.  
We examine non-linearity in the equation for real GDP of the reduced form VAR 
model. Further, we select oil price as the transition variable between the regimes, assuming 
that the impact on real GDP depends on the dynamics of this variable. Since matrix inver-
sion problems in the testing procedure can be avoided by omitting variables from the non-
linear part, we omit the dummy variables, the real exchange rate and prices, given that the 
focus of the linearity tests is centred on real GDP and oil. The testing sequence is ex-
plained in detail in Teräsvirta (2004), while p-values from the tests are shown in the ap-
pendix. In the tests, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of linearity for Iran, Ka-
zakhstan or Russia. For Venezuela, evidence of non-linearity is detected in the sense that a 
linear model is rejected in the favour of a logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR1 or Iikka Korhonen and Aaron Mehrotra 
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LSTR2, depending on which lag of oil prices is used as the transition variable). This sug-
gests that alternative modelling techniques that take non-linearity explicitly into account 
could be used. The actual estimation of an STR model is not feasible in our sample for 
Venezuela, due to a lack of observations. Nevertheless, in our view the possibility to con-
duct linearity tests against an STR model justify the use of this technique, as the latter 
model allows for regime-dependent dynamics, similarly to Huang et al. (2005).   
We note that while these results enable evaluation of the different shocks' impor-
tance on output and the real exchange rate, these are probably conditional on the policy 
regime in the estimation period and the structure of the economy. While the SVAR model 
is theory-based, the shocks are based on estimation of a reduced form system, which may 
not be policy invariant. Thus the Lucas critique may be important, quantitatively and quali-




7  Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have estimated structural vector autoregressive models for four major oil-
producing countries: Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Venezuela. In these four-variable mod-
els, we included the oil price, in addition to domestic GDP, prices and real exchange rate, 
which allows us to determine the effects of oil price shocks. 
We find that a positive shock to real oil prices leads to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate only in Iran and Venezuela. Oil price shocks explain only a relatively small 
portion of the forecast error variance in the real exchange rate, and especially in Kazakh-
stan and Russia their role is negligible. In all the countries demand shocks explain the ma-
jority of exchange rate variation, which accords with previous studies examining the de-
terminants of exchange rate fluctuations in other economies. As expected, oil price shocks 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on GDP, with the exception of Iran. The 
share of oil price shocks in explaining GDP movements is highest in Russia and Vene-
zuela. Nevertheless, supply shocks are much more important sources of shocks for output 
movements, possibly reflecting the on-going structural changes in all four economies.  
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




To summarise, the empirical results from the estimated models allow us to draw 
some policy conclusions. For the real exchange rate, the direct influence of oil shocks is 
limited, especially for Kazakhstan and Russia. Structural demand shocks account for the 
majority of forecast error variance in the real exchange rate. This may be because of the 
importance of fiscal policy during the period. During our sample period the oil price has 
also had a smaller effect on output developments than perhaps previously thought. Supply 
shocks – which can in this connection be perhaps interpreted as productivity improvements 
in catching-up economies – are able to explain the majority of forecast error variance in 
GDP.  
As linearity tests produce some evidence of non-linearity for Venezuela, future re-
search could benefit from an estimation of a threshold model or a smooth transition regres-
sion for this economy, allowing for explicit modelling of the asymmetric relationships be-
tween oil prices and economic activity. Such a task could be feasible with higher frequency 
data for output, perhaps in the form of industrial production. 
Finally, our results are of course subject to the Lucas critique. If any of the coun-
tries were to change its exchange rate regime, the estimated results might not be valid. At 
least in Russia the central bank seeks to move towards inflation targeting. In this connec-
tion, relatively tight management of the nominal exchange rate could be incompatible with 
the chosen regime. Somewhat paradoxically, this could very well strengthen the oil-shock 
effect on the real exchange rate, as the central bank would rely less on sterilisation of ex-
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Figure A.1 First differences of relative output and real exchange rate 
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Figure A.3. Effects of structural shocks on GDP 
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gure A.4  Effects of structural shocks on real exchange rate 









 Tr tion  variab
Hypothesis  Δ Δ Δ   oilt-1  oilt-2  oilt-3
H0  0.18 0.10 0.80 
H04 0.29  0.13    0.87 
H03  0.77 0.10 0.67 





 Tr tion  variab
Hypothesis  Δ Δ Δ   oilt-1  oilt-2  oilt-3
H0  0.51 0.41 0.82 
H04 0.45  0.24    0.93 
H03  0.81 0.57 0.49 





  ition vari
Hypothesis  Δ Δ Δ   oilt-1  oilt-2  oilt-3
H0  0.00 0.03 0.26 
H04  0.01 0.34    0.20 
H03  0.00 0.01 0.48 






 Tr tion  variab
Hypothesis  Δ Δ Δ   oilt-1  oilt-2  oilt-3
H0  0.30 0.96 0.67 
H04 0.19  0.74    0.53 
H03  0.33 0.74 0.80 
H02  0.65 0.95 0.33 
 
 
ote: see Teräsvirta (2004) fo N
o
r details of the testing sequence. Values in bold indicate that the null hypothesis 
f linearity can be rejected. 
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Horizon Supply  D   Monetary  emand
1  0.29 0.61 0.11 
5  0.42 0.49 0.10 
10  0.43 0.48 0.10 
20  0.43 0.48 0.10 
K     azakhstan
 S  D   Monetary  upply emand
1  0.11 0.83 0.06 
5  0.15 0.73 0.12 
10  0.17 0.70 0.13 
20  0.17 0.70 0.13 
 Russia 
 S  D   Monetary  upply emand
1  0.09 0.87 0.04 
5  0.08 0.88 0.04 
10  0.08 0.88 0.04 
20  0.08 0.88 0.04 
V     enezuela
 S  D   Monetary  upply emand
1  0.10 0.49 0.41 
5  0.14 0.39 0.47 
10  0.15 0.38 0.47 
20  0.15 0.38 0.47 
 
 
 Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by BOFIT, see 
bofit  www.bof.fi/
No 1  Tuuli Koivu: Has the Chinese economy become more sensitive to interest rates? Studying credit demand in 












































































Bank of Finland 
BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
PO Box 160 
FIN-00101 Helsinki 
 
 + 358 10 831 2268 
bofit@bof.fi 
 http://www.bof.fi/bofit 